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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
after they have been in existence 21 years. This statute attempts to take
away from reverter holders a property right to which they are, by valid
contract, lawfully entitled. Therefore, unless this statute comes within
some exception to the general prohibition against impairment of obliga-
tions of contract, the Florida statute is unconstitutional as applied to
the reverter right holders in this case, and those similarly situated.
Those cases which have held that a state, by legislation, may impair
obligations of contracts, have so held only when that legislation was a
valid exercise of state police powers.'6 The Florida Legislature based its
justification for the 1951 statute' 7 mainly on the ground that reverter
rights, unlimited in duration, make the title to land unmarketable, and
this has the effect of retarding the growth of the State.'5 Since reverter
rights of this type do make titles unnarketable, 19 and it is generally
conceded that state police powers embrace the state's economic welfare, 20
it is conceivable that this statute could have been upheld as constitutional.
However, courts have refused to uphold legislation which takes land, or
any interest therein, from one person and gives it to another purely for
private use.2' Therefore, the 1951 statute22 is unconstitutional as applied
to reverter clauses that were in existence when the statute was passed.
The decision in this case left some questions unanswered. Did the
court, in effect, place a new interpretation on the Murphy Act,23 or was
it held inapplicable? The Florida Supreme Court has previously held
that a tax title, under this act, vests fee simple title in the State and
that the act is constitutional. 2 4 Had the majority opinion been more explicit
on these questions, future litigation concerning these problems might be
greatly minimized.
Howard Barwick.
STATUTES-FLORIDA FAIR TRADE ACT-
U NCONSTITUTIONALITY
Plaintiff, a manufacturer, commenced an action against the defenC"nts,
attempting to enforce the Florida Fair Trade Act.' From a judgment
dismissing its complaint, plaintiff appealed. Held, the particular provision
of the Fair Trade Act sought to be enforced (i.e. the non-signer clause) 2
16. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933).
17. See note 1, supIra.
18. FLA. STAT. § 689.18 (1951 (Preamble.)
19. Jennings, Marketability of Titles in Florida, 7 MIAMI L.Q. 318 (1953).
20. Thomas v. Sanderlin, 173 N.C. 329, 91 S.E. 1028 (1917).
21. Treighe v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S- 189, rehearing denied, 297 U.S.
728 t1936).
23. See note 2, supra.23. See note 2, supra.
24. See Brice v. Haines City, 142 Fla. 371, 195 So. 919 (1940).
1. FLA. STAT., c. 541 (1953).
2. FLA. STAT. § 541.07 (1953).
CASENOTES
is unconstitutional and void. Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Eckerd, 73 So.2d
680 (Fla. 1954).
This present case is but the culmination of a series of decisions in
which the Florida Supreme Court has expressed its disapproval of -the
underlying philosophy of price fixing statutes. (A good example is State
ex rel, Fulton v. Ives3 declaring invalid a statute fixing minimum prices
for barber services4 which was passed during the great depression when,
presumably, the strongest case could have been made in favor of the
law). That the Fair Trade Act is, in fact, a price fixing statute has
been affirmed by the court 5 after an examination of the law's non-signer
provision, which reads, "Willfully and knowingly advertising, offering for
sale or selling any commodity at less than the price stipulated in any con-
tract entered into pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, whether
the person so advertising, offering for sale or selling is or is not a party
to such contract . . . is unfair competition."6 (Italics supplied).
There has been lively litigation and legislation on the Federal level
over similar provisions in various Fair Trade Acts throughout the country
and, for this reason, United States, as well as Florida, statutes and decisions
assumed a position of importance in the present case.
The Florida Supreme Court encountered the Fair Trade law in
19391 and 19421 and on both occasions managed to invalidate it on tech-
nical grounds without actually declaring the substance of the act ui-
constitutional. Such a process of letting the law live on borrowed time
could not, however, be continued indefinitely, and in 1949, with the
leading case of Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp.,9 the
non-signer clause contained in the 1939 act 10 was struck down as violative
of the constitution, it being held that the act served "a private rather
than a public purpose." Almost immediately the legislature amended
the law. Legislative findings of fact were annexed declaring, in con-
clusion, that the law was enacted as "an exercise of the police power
to serve the general welfare." A new provision was added, reading, "If,
aftehl'investigation, the attorney general deems that any contract authorized
by the provisions of this chapter prevents competition . . . he may bring
an action . . . to restrain the performance or enforcement of . . . such
contract."' 2
3. 123 Fla. 401, 167 So. 394 (1936).
4. Fla. Laws 1935, c. 16799, j 12.
5. Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d 371, 375 (Fla.
1949). (..... this statute is, in fact, a price fixing statute.")
6. FLA. STAT. § 541.07 (1953); Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25204, § 8; Fla. Laws 1939,
c. 19 01, § 6; Fla. Laws 1937, e. 1895, § 6.
7. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co., 137 Fla. 508, 188 So.91(19391 Scarborough v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co., 150, Fla. 754, 8 So.2d 913 (1942).
9.1401,.2d 37. (Fla. 1949).:
10. Fla. Laws 1939, c. 19201, § 6.
11. Fla. Laws 1949; c. 25204, § 1.
12. Fla. Laws 1949, *. 25204, § 10.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Equally important developments had taken place on the Federal
level. During the 1930's Congress passed the Millar-Tydings Act,13 which
purported to prevent fair trade agreements arising under state law from
being invalidated by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 4 Some years later,
on May 21, 1951, the United States Supreme Court, in Schwegmann Bros.
v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,15 held that the Millar-Tydings Act applied
only to contracts actually signed and did not prevent enforcement of the
Sherman Act against non-signers under Fair Trade Acts.
Therefore, in September, 1951, when the Florida Supreme Court
was for the first time confronted with the Fair Trade Act as amended,
it could, and did, hold the non-signer clause inoperative under federal
law, on authority of the Schwegmann case, without finding it necessary
"to decide the question of the effect which this court should give" to
the legislature's amendments.15
Congress, in 1952, passed the McGuire Act"7 which cured the defects
of the Miller-Tydings Act and overthrew the legal effect of the Schweg-
mann case. Consequently, when the present case arose, the court was,
for the first time, forced to consider directly not only the effect of the
fair trade amendments, but of the McGuire Act, on the constitutionality
of the law. However, in the decision it was pointed out that the McGuire
Act, while pre-eminent in its proper sphere, cannot operate to influence
the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of its own state's constitution.
"The decisions of this Court interpreting the Constitution of Florida are
supreme and will not be overthrown by act of Congress." Neither the
legislative findings of facts nor the delegation of power to the attorney
general were held to have remedied "the real vice of the non-signer clause,"
which was conceived to be lack of the "yardstick for protection of the
consuming public," the "yardstick" being defined as "our traditional con-
cepts of free competition." Thus, it was once again declared that, "The
non-signer clause must fall as an invalid use of the police power."
What, then, is the present state of the law in Florida regarding this
most important topic? Certainly, the non-signer clause, which is the sine
qua non of the Fair Trade Act, has been rendered entirely inoperative.18
A manufacturer, to effectively set minimum limits on the retail prices of
his products, must now sign a fair trade contract with every retailer in
the state who handles those products, an almost impossible undertaking.
Signing such agreements with some or most of the retailers would do no
good, since even a few of them able to undercut the others could
13. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1952).
14. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1-7 (1952).
15. 341 U. S. 384 (1951).
16. Seagram Distillers Corp. v. Ben Greene, Inc., 54 So. 2d 235, 236 (1951).
17. 66 STAT. 632 (1952), 15 U. S. C. §.45 (a) (1952).
18. Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Eckerd, 73 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1954); Liquor Store,
Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949).
CASENOTES
eventually destroy the whole minimum price structure. And, since the
Fair Trade Act applies solely to commodities "in free and open com-
petition with commodities of the same general class," 19 selling the product
to the retailer only on condition that he sign a minimum price contract
would be equally ineffective. He could simply refuse and buy the same
product from a rival producer. Neither could all producers combine
together to force minimum price contracts on the retailers, for this
would constitute a "horizontal" agreement in restraint of trade and would
subject them to the penalties of the anti-trust laws. 20 And, as a matter
of fact, the Florida Supreme Court has indicated, without ever having
had occasion to decide the question, that it might consider even voluntary
fair trade agreements invalid, as representing a denial of the principle
that "all shall stand equal before the law."'2 1
Assuredly therefore, with such a solid array of judicial precedent
and opinion mitigating against it, the Florida Fair Trade Act is, for all
practical purposes, no longer of any effect in this state.
David Edward Emanuel.
TAXATION-REFUNDS-LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS
Plaintiff brought an original mandamus proceeding to recover use
taxes paid under a Florida statute which subsequently was judicially
determined to be unconstitutional. Plaintiff bases his right to recovery
on another statute3 which authorizes the comptroller to make such a
refund ". . . if the claim be filed within one year after the right to
such refund shall have accrued . . . ." This action was begun less than
one year after the original statute was declared unconstitutional, and
more than two years after the last payment of the tax. Held, that the
right to refund accrued at time of payment of taxes, not at the time the
statute was determined to be invalid; and the refund claim, not having
been filed within one year from such accrual, was barred. State ex rel.
Victor Chemical Works v. Gay, Comptroller, 74 So.2d 560 (Fla. 1954).
One of the most controversial subjects in the field of taxation is that
of tax refunds. About the only point upon which most courts agree is
that there can be no recovery for illegal taxes voluntarily paid, in the
19. FLA. STAT., § 541.03(l) (1953).
20. Jayne v. Loder, 149 Fed. 21 (3rd Cir. 1906).
21. Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d 371, 376 (Fla.
1949) (Concurring opinion by Barns, J.).
1. FLA. LAws 1949, c. 26319.
2. Thompson v. Intercounty Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1952).
3. FA. STAT. § 215.26 (1943).
